Integrating Environmental Monitoring Data into GIS for the World Trade Center Emergency Response

Harvey Simon and Mark Gallo, United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 2

In the aftermath of the September 11 World Trade Center Disaster, the EPA was responsible for collecting, analyzing and interpreting a wide variety of environmental data to make decisions about worker safety protection and public health.  This paper describes the process of creating a monitoring database, integration of monitoring data into GIS during a crisis, and how data processing procedures evolved to streamline the flow of information from field collection and laboratories into data analysis systems to support decision making.

(Photo Credit: EPA Emergency Response Staff)

Air samples were also collected from sites in New Jersey across the Hudson River from the WTC. EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) went near Ground Zero, to survey the environmental damage and collect bulk dust that had been dispersed all over as the towers collapsed. The air and bulk samples were quickly delivered by car to private laboratories and the Emergency Response Team's  laboratory in Edison; the results were obtained overnight, providing valuable information on the types and levels of contaminants that had been released so the health of thousands of rescue workers and those residents in the surrounding communities could be protected.  Extensive monitoring for asbestos, particulates, metals, and organics was maintained in lower Manhattan, and at more remote sites in the five boroughs and New Jersey from the first few days of the disaster until the site was cleared in late June, 2002.  Monitoring at the Staten Island Landfill, which was used as a storage point for debris from the site to sift for remains and evidence, is still ongoing.

Primary monitoring activities were in downtown Manhattan and the vicinity of the Staten Island Landfill, although there were many additional regional sampling sites in the five boroughs and New Jersey.

Region 2's GIS operation was thrown into disarray by the attack.  The central GIS Team was based in EPA's New York Office and most Team members were evacuated on the day of the attack.  Regional GIS and information technology staff that had been evacuated from the New York office on the day of the attacks managed to contact each other and arranged to work out of the Region's laboratory in Edison, NJ where regional emergency operations had been established.  Within several days of the attack, they were providing full time support to Mark Gallo, the emergency response data management and GIS lead.  Several members of the GIS Team were at an EPA GIS Work Group meeting in San Francisco on the day of the attacks, and had to find their way home in the middle of a national air transportation crisis. One managed to fly home eventually, while the other two (including one of the authors) drove back by rental car.  The New York office was closed for the first few weeks, and telephone, Wide Area Network and Internet Access were unavailable or limited for an additional 7-10 days.  By luck, a mirror of all the Region's GIS data and applications had been maintained at the Edison Laboratory for several years - the purpose of this mirror was to improve performance for users in Edison, not for continuing operations in a crisis.  EPA GIS operations for the World Trade Center were based entirely in Edison until the New York office was fully functional.

Data Management Challenges

As the EPA response to the disaster evolved, it became clear that there were huge data management challenges that had to be resolved:

• Need for rapid, near-time processing of data for operational decisions, worker safety and public information: In addition to requiring rapid processing of data to support operational and public health decisions, EPA senior management decided very early on that monitoring data would be published via the Internet in as close to real time as possible.  This was an unprecedented activity for EPA.
• Multiple organizations collecting data, need for central clearinghouse: Many other organizations were also collecting data for the response and New York City requested that EPA develop a multi-agency database to store and share the information.   EPA agreed to take on this role and was responsible for distributing data and data products to responding organizations and the public.
• Data from different agencies in multiple electronic formats and hard copy: Many other organizations were also collecting data for the response and New York City requested that EPA develop a multi-agency database to store and share the information.  Data were initially provided in a wide variety of formats from paper to electronic spreadsheets, often with almost no metadata or background information.
• EPA data processing initially hard copy driven and not standardized: In the early stages of the response data were being delivered in hard copy format and entered into the database by hand, a laborious, error prone and time consuming process.
• Need for definition of cartographic product and data report requirements for a variety of uses: Many of the responding organizations, including EPA were “disconnected” while working in the field, and many local resident had no phone service or Internet access for extended periods of time. Production of hard copy maps and reports that effectively summarized data was vital to field work and communication with the public.
• Need for accurate base map, remote sensed and operational data: New York City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was destroyed the day of the attacks, but was re-established on a pier along the Hudson River within 48 hours of the event.  Region 2 staff obtained critical base map information from the EOC mapping center to ensure that EPA was working from the same base information as other responding agencies.
• Need for effective internal and external data coordination: The overwhelming amount of data, coupled with the need for rapid and effective dissemination to responders, managers and the public made effective coordination critical.

Data Management and Geospatial Support

Managing and Georeferencing Environmental Data

During the first few days following the attacks, Regional GIS and IT staff developed a Microsoft Access database to house all EPA monitoring data that was being processed by contract labs, acquired critical local data from New York City agencies working out of the Emergency Operations Center on Manhattan's west side, and established geocoding procedures in ArcView for monitoring locations and incorporations of locational information into the database. In the early stages of the response, data were being delivered in hard copy format and entered into the database by hand, a laborious, error prone and time consuming process. The Region 2 GIS Team developed automated procedures for data entry that radically reduced errors and data entry work effort.

Many other organizations were also collecting data for the response and New York City requested that EPA develop a multi-agency database to store and share the information.  EPA Office of Environmental Information (OEI) and OEI Systems Development (SDC) contract staff developed this database using the Region 2 Access database as a model within less then a week of this request. This required SDC staff to design, develop and implement a database management operation capable of tracking the results of environmental monitoring being conducted by 13 city, state, and federal agencies at the World Trade Center site. The system provided a front end interface with a wide range of search options and provides standard reports as well as download capabilities. SDC staff designed data entry templates and worked with the relevant organizations to facilitate the collection of their data into the system in whatever way was most efficient. At times this involved painstaking manual data entry of monitoring results from organizations who had lost their electronic connectivity – could not upload data results into a database - and were operating in "paper and fax" mode to submit their sampling results. In all, information from hundreds of monitoring sites covering a broad range of media and substances was entered into the database and made available for analysis and decision-making to Agency and City officials.   Access to the Multi-Agency Database was provided through a web interface developed by OEI which allowed EPA staff and participating agencies to easily extract data.

Web Delivery of Monitoring Results to Public

On the heels of the delivery of the WTC monitoring database was the challenge of providing public access to real-time status of monitoring results around the WTC.  OEI developed procedures for incorporating data from the multi-agency database into public access web pages.  A team of OEI, Region 2, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (OAQPS) and SDC staff collaborated in the development and delivery of a series of WTC data presentations – posted on EPA's Homepage beginning in early October - that provided users with detailed information on monitoring results at the WTC and the surrounding environment. These data presentations incorporated detailed maps of monitoring locations, utilizing base data layers provided by New York City, data tables showing specific monitoring results and incorporated context developed by EPA experts for public dissemination. To assure the data was kept as current as possible, an automated process was put in place to update the website presentations as the database itself was updated each day. This way, the public had access to the most current data in the database as it was received and EPA website statistics show that these materials received hundreds of thousands of hits over October and November. This was EPA's first attempt at near real-time delivery of emergency response sampling. (see http://www.epa.gov/wtc/).

To assure that web site users had a fully integrated view of the monitoring activities surrounding the WTC, the OEI/SDC Geospatial Team designed and developed a customized EnviroMapper for NYC Response utilizing ArcIMS. Building on the success of EPA's existing EnviroMapper applications, the NYC Response EnviroMapper provides a sophisticated interactive mapping interface that allows the user to select a geographic area and receive back a map that shows where environmental monitoring was conducted in the selected area, the type of monitoring done and the results that were found. (see http://www.epa.gov/enviro/nyc/em/)

Development of Data Summaries, Trend Analysis and Cartographic Products and Disseminating Information to EPA Staff and Cooperating Federal, State and Local Agencies

One of the telling aspects of this crisis was the impact on telecommunications. Many of the responding organizations, including EPA were “disconnected” while working in the field, and many local residents had no phone service or Internet access for extended periods of time. Production of hard copy maps and reports that effectively summarized data was vital to field work and communication with the effected public. The Region 2 GIS Team developed a suite of standard maps and data summaries that were updated regularly and printed for staff use. Adobe Acrobat versions of these maps were posted to both and Intranet site and a password protected Internet site so they could be printed and made available to staff in cooperating agencies in various New York City locations, Albany and Washington. These outputs were used at dozens of small and large internal, interagency and public meetings, (including Senate and New York City Council hearings) to explain air quality conditions and trends. Many of these outputs were developed in cooperation with New York City Department of Health staff involved in risk communication.

Lessons Learned

This incident stretched EPA's and other government organizations resources in unprecedented ways.  Based on our experience in dealing with data management and geospatial support, a number of lessons learned became apparent, many of which could provide useful guidance to any organization trying to prepare for large disasters or dislocations.

Disaster Recovery, Failover and Backup

• You might be at the center of a disaster and need to be able to protect your staff and offices, and get back in operation swiftly:
  • Develop individual office Emergency Response Plans which will itemize those critical functions that need to be provided and how to accomplish these tasks should we be unable to use our offices.
  • Develop a telephone and e-mail contact list for all members of the staff which would be published in “paper” and through a secure web site available to authorized users. In addition, develop a contact list for those that we would need to keep in contact with in future events (i.e., other Federal, state and local governments, grantees, vendors, etc.).
  • Establish back-up plans for continuing critical work functions should an office be unable to continue its operations.  Develop plans that would permit business continuing should an office be down or were unable to gain access to various Agency and Regional automated systems  – Develop a telephone cascade plan so that information can be moved from employee to employee. Home phone, cell phone and e-mail contact information for key employees with emergency response roles.
  • Establish web sites and off-premise automated telephone systems that would provide information to both staff and others needing to re-establish communications with EPA. – Consider telephone service from several Central Offices, rather than just one. Using more than one vendor does not guarantee they are not using the same physical network - you must verify and ask the right questions of service providers.
  • Supplement digital telephone service with analog for emergency purposes.
  • Cell phones, wireless and web-based e-mail critical assets.
  • Non-emergency security procedures may hurt you in a crisis, plan for flexibility when trying to re-establish operations..
  • Plan for alternate locations which can accommodate large numbers of staff, including the necessary voice, data, and e-mail infrastructure.
  • Mirror all critical data and applications at disaster recovery location(s).
  • Maintain a good relationship with your hardware and software vendors. Vendor flexibility and support during the crisis were invaluable.  Esri, for example, provided tremendous support to New York City in establishing it's Emergency Mapping Center, and responded quickly to give Region 2 temporary ArcGIS licenses for new machines installed in the Edison Laboratory.

Data Management, Data Analysis and Information Product Development

• Maintain IT capabilities and infrastructure: Veteran staff and contract support with broad skills, flexibility, and communication skills that understand Agency business are invaluable and in short supply in a crisis.
  • Networking/Telecom, RDBMS, programming, GIS, web development skills are all critical.
  • Keeping equipment up-to-date is vital
• Establish internal and external roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms in advance of a crisis, or as early as possible. Keep staff with poor communication, planning and team skills out of key coordination roles.
• Support development of an emergency response data management infrastructure that will provide emergency response teams with the necessary database and presentation tools to allow information to be efficiently recorded in a standardized format, available for decision-making and made accessible to the public.
  • Replace paper driven data collection, data delivery and QA processes with standards-based electronic processes that flow into data systems that support rapid integration and analysis. Don’t take years to do this.
  • Make data management and analysis an integral part of the data collection planning process. Know why you are collecting information and what you hope to use it for, and be aware of who else needs it. Secondary use is often more important than your own internal needs.
  • Presume that in a large emergency, public dissemination of critical information is an integral part of your emergency response work - and plan for it.
  • Develop web templates for hazard information for important contaminants in advance.  Development of this type of text takes more time than preparing the data.
  • Develop secure Extranet means to facilitate sharing of data, data services, and other information by responding organizations. Web services and geoservices have a big role here. Run scenarios and test how to do this in non-crisis situations.
  • Have ability to rapidly collect remote sensed information in place in advance. Define some standard delivery products that integrate well with existing software and staff capabilities. Raw data or difficult to understand remote sensing information is worse than nothing in a crisis.
  • Work with multiple involved agencies to develop good metadata for shared information
  • Design information products for different audiences and media
    • Graphic, easily understandable summaries of complex data invaluable
    • Hard copy needed as well as electronic and web
    • Need multiple mechanisms for dissemination

Conclusion

The varied elements of geospatial support for the World Trade Center response have important implications for EPA and its partners. The lessons learned from this experience will hopefully help the Agency prepare for the data management and analysis demands of future events, establish the infrastructure to continue operations when our own offices are affected by disasters, and prepare the means in advance to facilitate interagency cooperation and data sharing in a crisis.

DISCLAIMERS AND COPYRIGHTS

The content of this paper does not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency or the federal government.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

EPA's data and geospatial support for the World Trade Center was a highly collaborative effort with many participants making significant contributions, including:

EPA Region 2

Roch Baamonde, Bonnie Bellow, Yue-On Chiu, Robert Eckman, John Filippelli, Kenneth Fradkin, Bill Hansen, Barry Kaye, Bob Kelly, Carlos Kercado, Bob Messina, George Nossa, Barbara Pastalove, Harvey Simon, Robert Simpson, Stan Stephansen, Daisy Tang, Linda Timander, Erwin Smieszek, Richard Stapleton, Raymond Werner

EPA Office of Environmental Information
Debbie Villari, Dave Wolf, Julie Kocher

Systems Development Center

Adam Deer, Mash Eslami, Matt Moss, Michele Passarelli, Vincent Zhuang

EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards

Fred Dimmick, Dierdre Murphy, Debbie Stackhouse, David Mintz

New York City Emergency Mapping Center

Paul Katzer, Allan Leidner

New York State Office for Technology

Bruce Oswald, Thomas Henderson, Bill Johnson

New York City Department of Health
Caroline Bragdon

EPA Region 4
Don Norris (Detailed to New York from Athens Lab)

Apologies to any of the many others who helped that may have been inadvertently left off this list.

Mark Gallo
On-Scene Coordinator
United States Environmental Protection Agency Region 2